Awards of Attorneys\u27 Fees to Nonprevailing Parties Under the Clean Air Act—Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983) by Holmlund, Ingrid
Washington Law Review 
Volume 59 Number 3 
7-1-1984 
Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Nonprevailing Parties Under the 
Clean Air Act—Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983) 
Ingrid Holmlund 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ingrid Holmlund, Recent Developments, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Nonprevailing Parties Under the 
Clean Air Act—Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983), 59 Wash. L. Rev. 585 (1984). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol59/iss3/8 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES TO NONPREVAILING
PARTIES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT-Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
The Clean Air Act (the Act) I provides that in a suit for judicial review
of an agency action under the Act, "the court may award costs of litiga-
tion (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it
determines that such [an] award is appropriate.' '2 In Ruckelshaus v. Si-
erra Club,3 the United States Supreme Court held that this language per-
mits an award of attorneys' fees only to parties who prevail on the merits.
In a footnote, the Court extended its holding to sixteen other statutes with
identical provisions. 4
In Sierra Club v. Costle,5 the Sierra Club and the Environmental De-
fense Fund (EDF) had petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to review the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) pro-
mulgation of standards governing the control of sulfur dioxide emissions
from coal-fired powerplants. 6 Although the EPA prevailed in the deci-
sion, the court awarded attorneys' fees to the Sierra Club and the EDF
under section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 7 holding
that fee awards were appropriate because the petitioners had substantially
contributed to the goals of the Act. 8 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
1. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7626(Supp. V 1981).
2. Clean Air Act § 307(0, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (Supp. V 1981). The Clean Air Act contains two
provisions allowing litigants attorneys' fees. Although these two subsections contain almost identical
language, the provision pertaining to judicial review, § 307(0, is of primary concern in this Note.
Section 307(f) applies to litigation under § 307(b), which provides for direct judicial review of
agency actions in the federal circuit courts of appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (Supp. V 1981).
The other Clean Air Act fee awards provision, § 304(d), applies to citizen suits in federal district
courts. Id. § 7604(d). For the three types of citizen suits authorized, see id. § 7604(a).
3. 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). The series of cases leading to the attorneys' fees decision in Ruckel-
shaus began with Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the court adjudi-
cated the merits of challenges to EPA actions. Following this judgment on the merits, plaintiffs Sierra
Club and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) petitioned the court for fee awards in Sierra Club v.
Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274
(1983). In Ruckelshaus, the EPA appealed the court of appeals' award of attorneys' fees in Gorsuch
to the Supreme Court.
4. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. at 3275 n. I.
5. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
6. The Sierra Club argued that the EPA standards were invalid because the EPA had exceeded its
authority in establishing the standards and because there were defects in the rulemaking procedures.
Id. at 316-18. The EDF contended that the EPA's decisionmaking had been prejudiced by unlawful
ex parte contacts with private industry advocates. Id. at 386.
Other plaintiffs in Costle also petitioned the court for review of the EPA's adoption of the stan-
dards. The California Air Resources Board asserted the same claims as the Sierra Club. Id. at 312. A
group of electric utilities also challenged the EPA's standards, claiming that they were too strict. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (Supp. V 1981).
8. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus v.
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reversed, holding that a party must obtain some success on the merits to
be eligible for an award of attorneys' fees under section 307(f). 9
This Note will evaluate the soundness of the Supreme Court's holding
in Ruckelshaus. Part I describes the fee awards provisions in the Clean
Air Act and identifies the basic considerations behind fee awards. Part I
then reviews the Supreme Court's analysis in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club
of the validity of fee-shifting to nonprevailing parties. Part III presents an
evaluation of the Court's decision. It examines the Court's use of the leg-
islative history of the Clean Air Act, the general effectiveness of the
Court's holding, and the soundness of its extension to other statutes. In
Part IVA, a more effective standard for fee awards under section 307(f) is
proposed and assessed in terms of the basic fee-shifting considerations.
Finally, Part IVB applies this standard to Ruckelshaus, and concludes that
there was a reasonable basis for fee awards to the Sierra Club and the
EDF.
I. FEE AWARDS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Courts in the United States generally require that each litigant bear the
cost of its own counsel's fees. 10 There are three general exceptions to this
"American rule." Exceptions are recognized where fee awards are au-
thorized by contract,"1 by judicially defined equitable doctrines, 12 or by
statute. 13
Sierra Club. 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). In a separate case decided the same day, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit again awarded attorneys' fees to the Sierra Club and the EDF, although they had not
prevailed. Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Alabama Power. the
majority relied on essentially the same standard it had established in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch.
9. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274. 3276 (1983).
10. The American rule against shifting fees is an unusual approach. Under the system most com-
mon in other countries, exemplified by the English rule, the loser pays the prevailing litigant's attor-
neys' fees. For a discussion of the development of the American rule and fee awards systems in other
countries, see Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts. 122 U. PA
L. REv 636,639-44 (1974).
I1. E.g.. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
12. Under the bad faith doctrine, if the losing party acts in bad faith, the court may order that the
party pay its opponent's attorneys' fees as a punitive measure. E.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States
ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.. 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (attorneys' fees may be awarded to success-
ful party when opponent has acted in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons): Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I,
5 (1974) (rationale for fee award for bad faith is punitive). See generally' Berger, Court Awarded
Attorneys' Fees: What Is "'Reasonable"? 126 U. PA. L. REv 281, 302 (1977) (discussion of bad
faith rationale).
The common fund doctrine is invoked when a successful litigant creates or preserves a fund, and a
definite class of persons enjoys pecuniary benefits as a result. The court awards the litigant's attor-
neys' fees from the common fund to avoid unjustly enriching participants in the fund at the expense
of the litigant. E.g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). See generally Berger, supra. at
295-96 (describing evolution and application of common fund rationale).
If necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, a beneficiary of litigation may be assessed with the
Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Nonprevailing Parties
Federal fee awards provisions vary widely in scope and specificity. 14
Some statutes make fee awards mandatory, 15 while others provide for
awards in the court's discretion. 16 Most statutes provide that fees may be
awarded only to prevailing parties, 17 or to parties who have "substan-
tially prevailed," 18 or to parties who are "successful." 19
The Clean Air Act authorizes the court reviewing EPA actions to award
attorneys' fees "whenever it determines that such [an] award is appropri-
ate. ' '20 This is the least specific type of language found in fee awards
provisions. 21 Since the Act's language does not include the concept of
prevailing, it is uncertain whether courts may shift fees in favor of non-
prevailing as well as prevailing parties, and if so, what considerations
should guide the courts. 22
plaintiff's attorneys' fees under an outgrowth of the common fund doctrine known as the common
benefit theory, even if no fund is involved. For example, the common benefit theory has been applied
where shareholders brought a successful stockholder derivative suit against a corporation. The plain-
tiff's attorneys' fees were assessed against the corporation on the assumption that it had benefited
from the action. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See generally Berger,
supra, at 300-01 (discussing development of common benefit theory).
13. In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-62 (1975), the Su-
preme Court held that federal courts were limited to the traditional equitable bases for awarding fees
to the prevailing party absent express statutory authorization by Congress. The Court reasoned that
because such awards require judicial evaluation of the relative importance of the policy behind a
particular statute, it would ordinarily be an improper interference with Congressional authority for
courts to award attorneys' fees absent statutory authorization. Id. at 269.
The Court's decision halted a trend begun in the early 1970's, in which some courts had awarded
fees to prevailing plaintiffs without statutory authorization on the theory that the plaintiffs had acted
as private attorneys general by bringing actions benefitting the public. E.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (environmental case). This approach developed after the Court used
the private attorney general theory in affirming a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), under a statute authorizing such awards.
14. According to the majority in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, there are more than 150 federal fee-
shifting provisions. 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3276 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982).
16. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
17. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V
1981); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 18e (1982).
18. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982); Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1982).
19. See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2) (1982).
20. Clean Air Act § 307(0, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (Supp. V 1981); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)
(Supp. V 198 1) (authorizing fee awards in citizen suits "whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate").
21. Sixteen other federal statutes, mostly environmental and energy legislation, contain language
virtually identical to that in the Clean Air Act. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3275 n. 1
(1983).
22. The possibility of fee awards to nonprevailing parties is essentially relevant only for nonpre-
vailing plaintiffs. There is no apparent reason for awarding fees to a nonprevailing defendant; be-
cause the plaintiff won, the suit obviously could not have been frivolous. Furthermore, because the
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Judicial interpretations of the Clean Air Act's fee awards provisions
have reflected one or more of three basic considerations addressed by fee-
shifting systems. 23 The first consideration is the incentive effect that the
availability of fee awards may have on potential litigants. 24 The possibil-
ity of recovering fees may encourage parties to bring actions which could
lead to advances in policy. Such actions are often not economically at-
tractive or even feasible otherwise. The second consideration in fee-
shifting is that parties should be treated equitably. 25 The final considera-
tion, externalities, involves outside impacts of the litigation. These im-
pacts include influences on policy, changes in judicial rules governing a
particular policy under the Act, and indications of the need to enact legis-
lation. Generally, when nonprevailing parties have been awarded fees
under the Act, courts have emphasized externalities by identifying some
public benefit produced by the litigation. 26
II. THE RUCKELSHAUS v. SIERRA CLUB DECISION
In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court held that a party must prevail on
the merits to some extent in order to recover attorneys' fees. 27 Writing for
the majority, Justice Rehnquist began with the premise that the American
rule prohibits the shifting of fees between litigants, and that most statu-
tory departures from this rule have allowed recovery by the prevailing
party only. 28 The Court stated that it therefore would be "a radical depar-
ture from long-standing fee-shifting principles" to require a prevailing
defendant to pay the losing plaintiff's fees. 29 The Court reasoned that a
rule against shifting fees to nonprevailing parties was "rooted . . . in
intuitive notions of fairness," because it would be contrary to ordinary
defendant did not initiate the suit, fees should not be awarded as compensation for actively producing
some other benefit. Fee awards to prevailing defendants, however, are plausible where plaintiffs have
brought frivolous litigation. See infra note 53.
23. See generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982
DUKE L.J. 651, 652 (proposing that fee-shifting systems generally are based on three major con-
cems-equity, litigant incentives, and external effects-and observing that a particular fee-shifting
scheme may reflect one or more of these considerations).
24. See. e.g., Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639
F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (whether suit was of a type that Congress intended to encourage
through the citizen-suit provision is a highly relevant concern in determining whether nonprevailing
plaintiffs should be awarded attorneys' fees).
25. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
27. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3281 (1983).
28. Id. at 3276-77.
29. ld.at3276.
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conceptions of justice to force a defendant to pay the legal fees incurred
by a party who wrongly charged it with unlawful action. 30
In light of these considerations, the Court stated that fees should not be
awarded to nonprevailing parties under section 307(f) of the Clean Air
Act without a clear showing that Congress intended this result. 31 The
Court devoted the rest of its opinion to an extensive review of the legisla-
tive history of section 307(f). Concluding that the legislative history did
not provide evidence of clear congressional intent to authorize fee awards
to nonprevailing parties, 32 the Court held that fees could only be awarded
to parties who prevailed to some extent on the merits. 33
The Court considerably expanded the scope of its holding by stating in
a footnote that its interpretation of the term "appropriate" in section
307(f) controls construction of identically worded fee awards provisions
in sixteen other statutes and section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act.34 As a
result of the Court's interpretation of section 307(f) in Ruckelshaus, par-
ties litigating under those provisions also must prevail on the merits of an
issue in order to recover fee awards.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's
interpretation of section 307(f) was twisted by a predisposition toward the
American rule. 35 He contended that the language and legislative history
of section 307(f) indicate that Congress intended that nonprevailing par-
ties would be able to recover fee awards in exceptional circumstances. 36
He concluded that it would be an abuse of discretion to award fees to a
nonprevailing party "unless its contribution to the process of judicial re-
view, or to the implementation of the Act by the agency, had truly been
substantial and had furthered the goals of the Clean Air Act. ",37
III. AN ANALYSIS OFRUCKELSHAUS v. SIERRA CLUB
The Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus is grounded on tradi-
tional American doctrine which precludes fee awards to nonprevailing
parties. The Court's reliance on general historic fee-shifting conventions,
however, is valid only if it is supported by section 307(f). The majority
30. Id. at 3277.
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
33. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3281.
34. Id. at 3275 n. 1. The Court apparently interpreted previous cases as holding that similarly
worded attorneys' fees provisions are subject to the same standards. Id. at 3280. Justice Rehnquist
observed that in prior cases the Court had used identical standards in construing the term "prevailing
party" under various fee awards provisions.
35. Id. at 3282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 3290.
37. Id.
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misinterpreted the legislative history of the Act to arrive at an improper
construction of section 307(f). In addition, in prohibiting fee awards
under the Act to all nonprevailing parties, the Court failed to effectively
address fundamental considerations involved in fee-shifting schemes.
Furthermore, the Court multiplied the error in its analysis of section
307(f) by extending its holding to preclude fee awards to nonprevailing
parties in litigation under all identically worded provisions.
A. The Court's Misreading of Section 307(f)
The Court's conclusion that the statute provides only for fee awards to
prevailing or partially prevailing parties38 is not substantiated by the leg-
islative history of section 307(f). The House Report on section 307(f)
states,
the committee did not intend that the court's discretion to award fees under
this provision should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees
was the "prevailing party." In fact, such an amendment was expressly re-
jected by the committee, largely on the grounds set forth in [Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA]. 39
The Court reasoned that at the time section 307(f) was enacted, the
term "prevailing party" had been narrowly interpreted.4 0 It concluded
that the report simply indicated an intent to extend eligibility for fees be-
yond wholly prevailing parties to include partially prevailing parties as
well, and thus reflected the facts in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA (NRDC) 41 where the parties who recovered fees had only
partially prevailed. 42 It therefore held that Congress meant merely to fol-
low the result in NRDC, not to suggest that parties who lost on all issues
should be awarded fees. 43
38. Id. at 3279.
39. H.R. REP No 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 337, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG & AD
NEWS [hereinafter 1977 CONG & AD NEwS] 1077, 1416 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council.
Inc. v. EPA. 484 F.2d 1331. 1338 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Court quotes this passage from the House
Report in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. at 3278.
40. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3278.
41. 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (lst Cir. 1973).
42. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3279-80.
43. Id. at 3280. The majority cited language from an earlier verson of § 307(0) which provided
for mandatory fee awards to prevailing parties and discretionary awards to partially prevailing par-
ties. Id. at 3279, see S. 252, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 36 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1977 [hereinafter 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY], at 688 (1978).
The Court considered this evidence that Congress viewed prevailing parties and partially prevailing
parties as falling into distinct categories. It therefore asserted that the language in the House Report
stating that the court's discretion should not be restricted to prevailing parties simply reflects Con-
Vol. 59:585, 1984
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However, the majority's interpretation incorrectly concentrated on the
result rather than the reasoning in NRDC. The House Report clearly states
that the House committee relied "on the grounds set forth in [NRDC.]"44
As the dissent in Ruckelshaus noted, the court in NRDC held that to de-
cide whether fees should be awarded, the courts should consider not only
who won, but the benefits produced by the litigation.4 5 The NRDC court
did not suggest that fee awards should be granted solely on the basis of
whether the party prevailed to some extent.
The majority in Ruckelshaus also relied on the legislative history of
section 304(d), the companion provision to section 307(f), which pro-
vides for fee awards in citizen suits. 46 The legislative history of section
304(d) is relevant in interpreting section 307(f). 47 The Court's analysis of
section 304(d), however, is inapposite. The Court focused on the fact that
a major purpose of section 304(d) was to discourage meritless litigation
and suggested that fee awards to nonprevailing parties would have the
opposite effect of funding frivolous suits.4 8 This argument incorrectly as-
sumes, however, that all suits by nonprevailing parties are frivolous. 49
Both the Act itself and the legislative history indicate that Congress did
not intend to restrict fee awards to prevailing parties under section 307(f).
Congress' use of the term "appropriate" in section 307(f), rather than the
gress' view that fee awards to partially prevailing parties would be an extension beyond awards to
prevailing parties. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3279.
44. See supra text accompanying note 39; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. at
3288 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. NRDC, 484 F.2d at 1338, quoted in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. at 3287 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
In a less persuasive argument against the majority's standard in Ruckelshaus, the dissent noted
evidence that a Senate committee considered, but ultimately rejected, a section that would have re-
quired fee awards to prevailing parties and allowed awards to partially prevailing parties. 103 S. Ct.
at 3286 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See S. 252, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 36 (1977), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 43, at 688. The dissent implied that if Congress had intended to
limit fees to prevailing and partially prevailing parties, it would have adopted this language. Ruckel-
shaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3286 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority correctly points out, however, that
this language was rejected because it mandated, as opposed to permitting, fee awards to prevailing
parties, not because it was too restrictive. Id. at 3279 n. 11 (majority opinion).
46. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3280-81.
47. The two sections contain essentially the same language regarding fee awards. Moreover,
while § 304(d) was enacted seven years before § 307(f), Congress enacted § 307(f) to eliminate an
apparently inadvertent inconsistency in the explicit authorization of fee awards for citizen suits but
not for judicial review actions. A Senate Report indicates that when § 304(d) was enacted, Congress
had actually intended to provide for fee awards under § 307(0 as well. The report states that § 307(0
was adopted "to carry out the intent of the committee in 1970 that a court may, in its discretion,
award costs of litigation to a party bringing a suit under section 307." S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong.,
I st Sess. 99 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 1473.
48. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3281.
49. In addition, the majority ignored the portion of § 304(d)'s legislative history stating that the
court may award fees to either party without regard to the outcome of the litigation. See infra note 52
and acompanying text.
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more specific language it had adopted in other fee awards provisions, 50
suggests that it intended a broader standard. 51 The legislative history of
the Act as a whole shows that the Court made an unnecessarily narrow
interpretation of section 307(f) when it construed it to include only parties
who succeed wholly or partially on the merits. According to a Senate
Report, under section 304(d), "[t]he court may award costs of litigation
to either party whenever the court determines such an award is in the pub-
lic interest without regard to the outcome of the litigation." 5 2
B. The Effectiveness of the Court's Standard for Fee Awards Under
Section 307(f)
The Court's decision in Ruckelshaus prohibits awarding fees to a party
unless the party prevailed on the merits of an issue. This standard, how-
ever, undermines the basic fee-shifting considerations of incentives,
equity, and externalities.
The legislative history of section 307(f) indicates that fee awards were
intended "to encourage litigation which will assure proper implementa-
tion and administration of the [A]ct or otherwise serve the public inter-
est. "53 However, the Court's interpretation of section 307(f) limits its
incentive effect. Poorly funded public interest groups will not bring ac-
tions unless they are confident that they will prevail on the merits. Thus,
the Court's standard effectively discourages frivolous litigation, but at the
cost of inhibiting some legitimate actions.
In Ruckelshaus, the Court's sense of equity in denying fee awards to
nonprevailing parties54 is largely legitimate. It is generally inequitable to
assess a prevailing party for the legal fees of its opponent. However, the
circumstances of a particular case may indicate that the loser should not
have to pay its own costs. 55 For example, a party may bring a valid, sub-
50. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
51. Ruckelshaus. 103 S. Ct. at 3285-86 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
52. S. REP No 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 465 (1974), quoted in Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. 3289
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. H.R. REP. No- 294, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess. 337 (1977), reprinted in 1977 CONG & AD NEWS.
supra note 39, at 1416. Section 307(f) also was intended to function as a disincentive to frivolous
actions. Id. Thus, if a plaintiff brought a frivolous suit, the defendant might recover a fee award.
54. Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3277; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g.. Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136, 142, 145
(D.D.C. 1974) (fees awarded to plaintiffs who did not prevail on the merits "only because of the
inherent difficulties of proof," thereby benefitting public by illustrating local government inaction
and burden on private parties seeking to enforce the Clean Air Act), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d
1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 353,
355 (D. Del. 1974) (although fee award was denied to nonprevailing party due to absence of compel-
ling equity, a losing party could be awarded fees where "exceptional circumstances tip the balance of
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stantial claim, and lose solely because of intervening events, such as a
change in the defendant's behavior or policy concerning the challenged
action. 56 Although the plaintiff has technically lost, the legitimacy of the
original claim has not diminished, and therefore a fee award to the plain-
tiff may still be appropriate.
Furthermore, the unfairness of assessing fees against the prevailing de-
fendant in a section 307(f) suit may be ameliorated because the defendant
will always be the EPA, a government agency. Assessing fees against a
government agency that can spread the costs widely is more defensible
than assessing them against a private business. While businesses can
spread the costs of attorneys' fees assessments by raising prices to con-
sumers, there is no assurance that consumers constitute the appropriate
class to shoulder the entire burden. An assessment of fee awards against
the government would more likely result in an even and properly targeted
distribution of the costs because they would be directed ultimately to the
taxpayers. Such awards are proper because taxpayers benefit from refine-
ment of the law under the Act, and because the EPA acts on their be-
half. 57
The external impacts of awarding fees based on the Court's standard
would vary from case to case. Generally, however, this standard may fail
to encourage suits that would advance the discussion of important policy
issues under the Act. For example, the Sierra Club and the EDF might
have not litigated if uncertain about their chances of recovering fees.
the equities decidedly in [its] favor;," court must consider "the actions of both parties during the
course of the litigation as well as during the relevant preceding period") aff'd, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir.
1975).
56. In Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1981), plaintiffs challenged the operation of an incinerator under a District of Columbia
implementation plan filed with the EPA. The plan was subsequently revised, rendering their claim
moot. The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of a fee award to the plaintiffs, stating
that although their claim had been dismissed, the suit was "a prudent and desirable effort to achieve
an unfulfilled objective of the Act." Id. at 804.
57. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973), the court
stated that it was fair to assess the EPA for the nonprevailing plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, for this "is to
spread them ultimately among the taxpaying public, which receives the benefits of [the] litigation."
Id. at 1334. The court drew an analogy between the EPA's relationship to the plaintiffs and the
connection between a corporation and its plaintiff shareholders when fees are awarded the plaintiffs
under the common benefit doctrine. See supra note 12. The court suggested that the EPA and the
corporation are in similar positions; each is "a party who exists to serve or represent the interests of
all those benefitted," and thus can be assessed with attorneys' fees when the litigation creates a
significant benefit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d at 1333-34. But cf.
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that fees should not be assessed against government because this diverts scarce public resources).
Potential fee assessments against the government in litigation to review agency action may also
exert a positive influence on the agency. The prospect of such assessments may function as an over-
sight mechanism, encouraging the agency to implement the Act correctly.
593
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Without litigation, the Court would have had no opportunity to consider
significant issues. Indeed, the lower court in Ruckelshaus highlighted the
external impacts of the Sierra Club's and the EDF's litigation, 58 stating
that these parties had substantially contributed to the goals of the Act by
raising major, complex questions concerning its interpretation. 59
By prohibiting fee awards to all nonprevailing parties, the Court has
inadequately responded to fundamental considerations behind fee-
shifting. First, while the Court's holding discourages frivolous litigation,
it could also deter parties from bringing meritorious actions. Second, an
automatic denial of a fee award to a nonprevailing party may be inequit-
able, depending on the circumstances of the litigation. Finally, this strict
standard may impede the deliberation of significant issues concerning the
Act. Because the Court's standard neglects these basic fee-shifting con-
siderations, it is an ineffective approach to fee awards under the Act.
C. The Court's Extension of its Holding to Other Statutes
The Court's tenuous analysis of fee awards under section 307(f)
reaches far beyond litigation under the Clean Air Act. It extended the
holding to control the construction of all other fee awards statutes con-
taining identical language. 60
The broad scope of the Court's holding is unjustifiable. First, the
Court's faulty interpretation of the legislative history of the Clean Air Act
fails to support its conclusion regarding fee awards under section 307(f).
Extending this flawed reasoning to sixteen other statutes only compounds
the basic error. Moreover, the Court applied its holding to the other stat-
utes without considering their purposes. To legitimately construe these
statutes, the Court should have expanded its analysis to examine their
legislative histories.61
Most of the provisions affected by the Court's decision are contained in
environmental and energy legislation. As a result of the Court's holding,
litigation in these major areas of public interest activity may be restricted.
To reverse such a trend, Congress should amend the provisions, stating in
more explicit terms when fees should be awarded.
58. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
59. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1982) rev'd sub noma. Ruckelshaus
v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). Similarly, in Alabama Power v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d I (D.C.
Cir. 1982), the court stated that the controlling consideration was not who had prevailed, but
"whether litigation by that party has served the public interest by assisting the interpretation or imple-
mentation of the Clean Air Act." Id. at 3; see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
484 F.2d at 1338 (court awarded fees to plaintiffs who had prevailed on some issues; "[wle are at
liberty to consider not merely 'who won' but what benefits were conferred").
60. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
61. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3286 n. 13 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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IV. IDENTIFYING AND APPLYING AN EFFECTIVE FEE-
SHIFTING STANDARD
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act indicates that Congress
intended section 307(f) to allow for fee awards to some parties who did
not prevail on the merits. The legislative history provides little clear guid-
ance, however, for formulating a standard for such awards. 62 An accept-
able standard should consider incentives, equity, and externalities. A pro-
posed standard for fee awards under section 307(f) that includes a variety
of factors would effectively promote these three basic fee-shifting consid-
erations. When applied to Ruckelshaus, this factors standard supports the
circuit court's award of fees to the Sierra Club and the EDF.
A. The Factors Standard
The factors standard63 generally addresses whether a party's litigation
substantially contributed to the implementation of the Act. The standard
identifies four factors that indicate when a plaintiff's contribution to the
Act is sufficiently substantial to warrant a fee award.
62. In his dissent in Alabama Power v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1982), Judge Wilkey
argued that congressional direction regarding § 307(0 is so lacking that the judiciary should abstain
from establishing any new standard departing from traditional rules. He reasoned that the court can-
not create a standard for fee awards under § 307(f) without making policy determinations and inter-
fering with the legislative function, in possible violation of article III of the Constitution. Id. at 20.
He concluded that the court must therefore apply the traditional "prevailing" standard to avoid a
policymaking role. Id. at 32.
The weakness in Wilkey's argument lies in his assumption that by adopting the "prevailing" stan-
dard, the court would be abstaining from policymaking. Whether it adopted the "prevailing" stan-
dard or a broader one, the court would be acting in the face of an unclear congressional policy regard-
ing § 307(f). The adoption of a "prevailing" standard is arguably more active policymaking by the
court because it conflicts with the implicit congressional intent of § 307(f) that a broader standard
should govem. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 42 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (adopting a
"prevailing" standard would be rewriting Congress' legislation), rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
While it is true that specific direction to the court for applying § 307(f) is lacking, there are indica-
tions that Congress did intend a standard other than "prevailing." Courts should accept the responsi-
bility for making a reasonable interpretation of the statute that comports with existing evidence of
congressional intent.
63. The factors standard is composed of several elements, some of which have been suggested by
various courts in determining whether fees should be awarded. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
103 S. Ct. at 3290 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (court should consider importance, novelty, and com-
plexity of issues raised, and whether party seeking fee award had an economic incentive to litigate);
Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (Judge Greene considered whether party seeking fees added anything new to the
law); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 39 (parties addressed issues that were important, complex
and novel, and assisted substantially in resolution of issues); Northern Plains Resource Council v.
EPA, 670 F.2d 847, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1982) (court considered party's self-interest in litigating).
595
Washington Law Review
The first factor concerns the petitioner's motives in litigating. A plain-
tiff with a sufficient economic incentive to litigate even in the absence of
the fee awards provision would not recover a fee award. 64 The motives
factor does not imply that a party with an economic interest in an action is
litigating in bad faith; rather, it presumes that a fee award to a party with
sufficient interest in an action is gratuitous. 65
Prior court decisions have deemed the motives factor irrelevant be-
cause a plaintiff with economic interests in bringing an action could still
contribute to the implementation of the Act by its litigation. 66 However,
assuming that a primary objective of fee awards is to encourage meritori-
ous actions that might not otherwise be brought, there is no reason to
award fees to those parties who would have litigated without the prospect
of such awards. The motives factor has also been criticized because an
inquiry into the plaintiff's motives is complex and speculative. 67 How-
ever, while it may be impossible to identify all the motives involved in a
party's decision to bring an action, in most cases a court can determine
whether a party had economic interests in litigating. 68
The motives factor would best function as a threshold criterion. A party
who did not meet this test would receive no further consideration for a fee
award. If a party met this threshold test, the remaining three factors
would then be applied to determine whether the party should.be awarded
fees. These factors would guide the courts in identifying substantial con-
tributions to the implementation of the Act; it would not be necessary for
a party to meet all the factors in order to recover an award. In addition,
64. See. e.g., Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 670 F.2d at 848-49 (court awarded
fees to nonprevailing plaintiff, noting that its members' self-interest in litigating would have been an
insufficient incentive); see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. at 3290 (Stevens. J., dissent-
ing) (dissent states that court should consider whether a party had an economic incentive to litigate).
65. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1982) (EPA
argued that there was no need for a fee award because plaintiffs had sufficient financial motivation to
litigate without potential of recovering such an award).
66. In Florida Power, the court held that a utility that had successfully challenged the EPA could
recover attorneys' fees under § 307(f), regardless of its financial motivation in litigating. Id. at 943.
Under the court's interpretation of § 307(f), the main concern was whether the result of the suit would
aid proper implementation and administration of the Act; the fact that the party had a financial interest
in the outcome was considered irrelevant. Id; see also Alabama Power v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 27
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The court in Florida Power conceded that the argument
against awarding fees to a party whose primary motive in litigation was economic interest might be
persuasive from a policy standpoint. The court concluded, however, that it could not could not prohi-
bit fee awards to a party with an economic interest since Congress had not expressed any intent to
disqualify such a party. Florida Power, 683 F.2d at 943.
67. See Alabama Power v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 28 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (cautioning against
court involvement in "complex analyses of economic actors' decisionmaking").
68. If a poorly funded public interest group undertakes highly complex litigation, this suggests
that it is litigating with the hope of a fee award. The complexity of the issues raised in the litigation
has been considered by some courts in deciding whether fees should be awarded. See infra note 69.
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the factors would be weighed differently in each case depending on the
specific fact pattern.
The second factor in the standard is whether the party prevailed on the
merits. Generally, a losing party is less likely than a prevailing party to
have actually contributed to the implementation of the Act. The fact that
the litigant did not succeed may indicate that the agency is already imple-
menting the Act correctly.
This factor incorporates the Court's concern in Ruckelshaus by recog-
nizing that, in many cases, a nonprevailing party should not recover fees.
Under the factors standard, however, prevailing on the merits becomes
one of several factors to be considered, rather than an absolute require-
ment as held in Ruckelshaus. The factors standard allows for the possibil-
ity that a litigant who has lost on the merits could aid in the overall imple-
mentation process. For example, even if the particular agency action
challenged in the suit was vindicated, the court's advancement or clarifi-
cation of a questionable point of law may subsequently assist the agency
in implementing the Act. The two remaining factors in the standard re-
flect this possibility.
The third factor requires a new development in the law as a result of the
plaintiffs litigation. 69 A case resulting in new rules of law to be applied
69. See Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Kaktovik, a case in
which nonprevailing plaintiffs were denied fee awards, Judge Greene emphasized that their litigation
had added little new to the law. Id. at 232 (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
suit was brought under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356,
1801-1802, 1811-1847, 1861-1866 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981), and the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 (1982), which contain fee awards provisions similar to those in the Clean Air
Act.
An additional factor mentioned by some courts as a criterion for judging whether fees should be
awarded is the complexity of the issues involved. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274,
3290 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). The litigation of complicated
issues may increase the likelihood that the suit will produce developments in the law. However, the
fact that the issues are complex should not in itself be a reason for a fee award; the important question
is whether the resolution of the issues contributes to the maturation of the law under the Act.
Alternatively, complexity may be interpreted as a sign that the issue is so unusual or intricate that
the court must rely heavily on the assistance of counsel because it is treading on unfamiliar ground.
This interpretation is related to past suggestions that courts consider the degree of technical and legal
assistance provided to the court. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. at 3290 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). It is questionable, however, whether this factor should be a reason for awarding fees.
All parties' counsel aid the court in its understanding of the issues; that is their role. Attorneys are
expected to demonstrate competence in presenting the issues they raise. Even if counsel demonstrate
exemplary skill and effort to provide needed assistance to the court, it does not follow that a substan-
tial contribution to the implementation of the Act has been made. See Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 227
(court denied attorneys' fees even though it was impressed with the counsel's competence, for "de-
spite ... counsel's considerable skill it was difficult for them to list any contributions of substance
from their suit"). The degree of technical and legal assistance should be considered in calculating the
amount of fees to be awarded, rather than in deciding the preliminary issue of whether fees should be
awarded at all.
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prospectively may substantially affect implementation of the Act. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff's arguments could stimulate the court to reinterpret
the statute in a new light, even if this new interpretation does not result in
victory for the plaintiff. Also, a case of first impression may clarify a
previously unexplored or uncertain aspect of the Act, thus contributing
substantially to the interpretation of the Act. 70
The final factor considers whether the litigation indicates a need for
new legislation. 7 1 A case may raise issues so unusual that they are un-
answerable through references to the existing law. By its action, the los-
ing plaintiff would, therefore, have contributed to the implementation of
the Act by revealing inadequacies in the law.
The factors standard promotes all three of the fundamental considera-
tions behind fee-shifting. Under this standard, a reasonable prospect of
recovering fees encourages parties with legitimate claims. This was the
main goal of section 307(f). 72 At the same time, the factors standard dis-
courages frivolous claims by providing specific criteria for recovering
fees.
The factors standard implicitly acknowledges that equity to the parties
involves more than the outcome on the merits. The more substantially
particular litigation contributes to the implementation of the Act, the
more fairness may require a fee award to a nonprevailing plaintiff.
Finally, the factors standard responds to externalities by accounting for
the broad impacts of litigation. Two of the factors in the standard-bring-
ing about developments in the law, and indicating a need for new legisla-
tion--directly concern external benefits.
The factors standard effectively addresses all three fee-shifting consid-
erations. In addition, it is sufficiently concrete to distinguish those cases
in which a nonprevailing party should receive attorneys' fees.
B. Applying the Factors Standard to the Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club
Decision
Applying the proposed factors standard to Ruckelshaus allows for a
concrete, principled analysis of whether attorneys' fees should have been
awarded. 73 As for the Sierra Club's and the EDF's motives in litigating, it
70. The dissent in Ruckelshaus briefly mentions that the novelty of the issues should be consid-
ered. 103 S. Ct. at 3290 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 227 (fee award
denied where issues were similar or analogous to issues already adjudicated elsewhere). Sierra Club
v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 39 (court notes that issues addressed were novel).
71. W. RODGERS. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.13 (1977).
72. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
73. The majority in Ruckelshaus barely dealt with the facts involved, treating the issue of attor-
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is reasonable to assume that as public interest organizations, they were
litigating for the sake of a broader cause than their own economic inter-
ests. In addition, because the issues were extraordinarily complex and
technical, involving massive preparation, 74 the plaintiffs probably would
not have been sufficiently motivated to litigate in the absence of potential
fee awards. 75
Assuming the Sierra Club and the EDF would pass the threshold mo-
tives test, the remaining factors in the standard should be considered.
These plaintiffs plainly failed to meet the second factor: prevailing on the
merits. Whether fees should have been awarded, therefore, depends on
how they might otherwise have contributed to the implementation of the
Act.
The Sierra Club's and the EDF's litigation satisfies the third factor in
the standard, since the case produced important additions to the body of
law under the Act. Although they did not prevail, both parties signifi-
cantly affected judicial interpretation of the Act and future agency imple-
mentation. 76 In addition, both parties raised novel questions. Their claims
concerned EPA's implementation of certain 1977 amendments to the Act,
which had never before been examined by the courts. 77
Finally, the Sierra Club and the EDF did not produce any effects that
would satisfy the final factor in the standard. Neither party's litigation
neys' fees entirely as a matter of law. Therefore, the factors standard is applied here to the facts as
they are addressed in the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch.
74. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
75. The court did not fully discuss the plaintiffs' particular motivations in litigating. However, it
did state that no other party besides the Sierra Club and the EDF had sufficient economic interest to
raise the questions they posed. Id..
76. The Sierra Club was the sole party to raise the question of the EPA's authority and basis for
adopting a variable percentage reduction standard for emissions, an issue that the EPA itself had
conceded to be critically important at the beginning of rulemaking. Id. at 40-41. Had this issue not
been contested, the outcome of other issues in the case could have been affected because of the
interdependence of individual emissions standards under § 11 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp.
V 1981). Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 41. The court's decision on another issue raised by
Ruckelshaus, the reliability of the econometric model used by the EPA to forecast impacts of possible
standards, would influence agency procedures in other substantive areas. Id. at 40. The EDF's ex
parte contacts challenge gave the court an opportunity to clarify the operation of the new § 307(d) and
to help resolve difficult questions of interpretation in future rulemaking proceedings under the Act.
The court cited evidence that the EDF's claim had stimulated discussion in the executive branch of
proper limits on ex parte comments in other agency proceedings. Id. at 41.
77. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 40. The Sierra Club's claims provided the first signifi-
cant opportunity for judicial interpretation of amendments to § 111 of the Act, concerning the EPA's
establishment of emission standards for new pollution sources, and the relationship among several
recently amended sections of the Act. Id. In addition, the EDF's claim of procedural defects in
rulemaking due to ex parte contacts led to the first comprehensive judicial interpretation of § 307(d),
which contained a new set of rulemaking guidelines under the Act. Id.
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indicated the need for new legislation; the court was able to decide the
issues with reference to the existing Act.
In sum, under the factors standard, the strongest arguments for fee
awards to the Sierra Club and the EDF are manifested in the presence of
the third factor. Despite losing on the merits, both plaintiffs made sub-
stantial contributions to the interpretation and implementation of the Act.
Assuming that the plaintiffs also satisfied the threshold motives test, their
litigation in Ruckelshaus presented a sound basis for awards of attorneys'
fees.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's prohibition of attorneys' fees awards to nonpre-
vailing parties in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club was inappropriate. Denying
fee awards to all nonprevailing parties is inconsistent with the congressio-
nal intent behind the Clean Air Act's fee awards provisions. In addition,
the Court's holding inadequately addresses important considerations
underlying fee awards. Moreover, the Court unjustifiably expanded its
holding to preclude the award of fees to nonprevailing parties under all
fee-shifting provisions identical to section 307(f). By incorporating ele-
ments reflecting the considerations of incentives, equity, and externali-
ties, the proposed factors standard allows for a rational evaluation of peti-
tions for fee awards. An application of the factors standard to
Ruckelshaus demonstrates that the court of appeals' decision to award at-
torneys' fees to the Sierra Club and the EDF should have been affirmed.
Ingrid Holmlund
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